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Appeal No. 8733 
ARGUMENT ON REPLY 
Because of certain matters raised in the Brief of 
Respondents, the plaintiff and appellant deems it neces-
sary to file a short reply brief. Thia brief reply will 
cover briefly three points : 1. Imputed Negligence, 2. 
X egligence of the Defendants, 3. Definition of "Park". 
I. lMPUrrED NEGLIGENCE 
On Page~ 8 and 9 the respondents refer to the pre-
trial conference held in this case, and then assert that 
when issues of fact and questionl::l of law have been 
formed at pre-trial, no proof is required at the trial. 
Appellant;-; disagree with this po~ition asserted by 
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the respondents. In the first place, following an inform-
al discussion at the pre-trial hearing, the trial Court 
decided that it was not necessary to formulate any pre-
trial issues, and no pre-trial order was entered by the 
Court. We realize that this matter as raised by respond-
ents in their Brief is outside of the record, but because 
an issu~ has been made of it by the respondents, we deem 
it necessary to set forth our views concerning what went 
on at pre-trial. 
At the pre-trial, defendants raised the issue of con-
tributory negligence. Counsel for the plaintiff expressed 
complete surprise that contributory negligence would be 
raised at which tiine defendants' counsel stated that 
under the law of Idaho the negligence, if any, of a hus-
band was in1puted to the wife. This was purely an as-
sertion on the part of the defendants and at no time 
would or did plaintiff's counsel agree that such \Yas the 
Jaw in Idaho. In fact, the position wa" taken by plaint-
iff'~ counsel that the~· were not aware of any law where 
the negligence of a husband could be in1puted to a wife 
except in a principal-agent relationship. At that point. 
the trial Judge remarked to defendants' counsel that 
the dortrine of in1puted negligence "·as not the law in 
1 ·tall and that in the ahsenre of proof it would be as-
~mnPd that tltP law of an~· foreign jurisdiction would be 
t!H· ~alllP a~ in rtah. There ('Pl'tainl~- was no adn1ission 
that thP law ol' Idaho would intpute the negligence of a 
1111..-halld to a wife nor wa~ there an~· stipulation or ad-
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mission that Idaho was a community property State. 
rrhere was no determination made at that time th~t 
under the laws of Idaho the doctrine of imputed negli-
gence existed, nor has there been any such determination 
made since said time. Nor has there been any proof of-
fered in any form whatsoever, including the brief of the 
respondents on file before this Court, which establishes 
that the laws of Idaho recognizes the doctrine of imputed 
negligence. 
We strongly contend that at no time or at no place 
has the doctrine of imputed negligence ever been es-
tablished in this case. 
But to go a step further, even if we assume that the 
1loctrine of imputed negligence does exist in Idaho, we 
then say that it is not aplplicable in this case, and we cite 
now, as cited _in our Brief, the case of Bruton vs. 
T'illoria (1956, Cal.), 292 P. (2d) 638, which states 
unequivocally that even in a com1nunity property State, 
where the doctrine of imputed negligence is recognized, 
the negligence of the husband is NOT imputed to the 
wife where the parties are residents of a non-community 
property State. 
The proof presented by the plaintiff is clear and 
convincing that the plaintiff and her husband were resi-
dents of ~I ontana, and that ~I ontana was not a connnuni-
i~' property State. rrh(' defendants and respondents have 
<~hosen to ignore this :-;tatn:-; of the law. If there is any 
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authority to the contrary, it has not been furnished to 
the plaintiff and appellants, or to either the trial Court 
or to the Supreme Court to our knowledge. 
2. NEGLIGENCE OF THE DEFENDANTS 
It is the plaintiff's contention that the defendants 
were guilty of negligence which was a contributing cause 
to the accident ( 1) by reason of their breach of the or-
dinance, and (2) independent of the ordinance, that 
plaintiffs were guilty of common-law negligence, and 
it is plaintiff's position that reasonable minds cannot 
differ on either of these points. 
Reference is n1ade to the recent case of Burns cs. 
FishPr, (~font. E);)7), 313 P. (2d) 104-!. wherein the ~fon­
tana Supreme Court held that a party was guilty of 
negligence as a n1atter of law when he re1nained seated 
in his truck that was stalled on a main arterial high-
way where traffic can be expected to be passed at any 
tirne. rrhe Court refused to subn1it the question of negli-
gence to a jur~·. The theory of the case, very strongly pre-
~E:>nted by the ~fontana Suprerne Court, is that reasona-
ble n1inds cannot differ that it is negligence to remain 
~Pated in a tnwk stopped on a rnain arterial highway 
without appropriate warning n1easures being taken, 
and that ~ueh neglig-PIH'e E:>xist.s even though the lights 
of the truck are burning at the ti1ue of the collision. 
rpltt> :\lmJtana Court eitP:-; a nmnber of .Jiaryland 
<·a~P~. nnd in particular, the ea~e of ~11 art in rs. Sweeney 
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207 Md. :l-!:3, 114 A. 2d 825, where plaintiff remained in 
a car which was allowed to remain on the traveled 
portion of a highway and was struck b~- an oncoming ve-
hicle. Plaintiff was held guilty of contributory negli-
gence as a matter of law. rrhe l\faryland Court stated: 
"It is axion1atic that the law places upon one the 
duty of exercising reasonable care for his own 
protection under any and all circumstances and 
that this requirement of the law is little more 
than is naturally practised under the instinct of 
self-preservation. What an ordinarily prudent 
and careful person would do under a given set 
of circumstances is usually controlled by the in-
stinctive urge to protect himself from harm. 
Yockel vs. Gerstadt, 154 Md. 188, 194, 140 A. 40. 
This principle has been applied where one leaves 
a place of safety to venture into a place or posture 
of danger, and is harmed; in such cases, the ven-
turesome one often has been held to be guilty of 
contributory negligence as a matter of law. 
Y ocket vs. Gerstadt, supra; Billmeyer vs. State 
to Use of Whiteman, 192 Md. 419, 64 A. 2d 755; 
Schaub vs. Community Cab, Inc., 198 Md. 216, 81 
A. 2d 597 ; Domeski vs. Atlantic Refining Co., 202 
Md. 562,97 A. 2d 313. Conversely, where one who 
remains in a place of danger with time and the 
physical ability to leave and is harmed, the courts 
have often held such failure to act to be contri-
butory negligence as a matter of law. Restate-
ment Torts Sec. 466". 
~Iany cases are there cited in support of the 
statement. See also to the same effect Western 
Casualty & Surety Co. vs. Dairyland, etc., Co., 
273 Wis. 349, 77 N. W. 2d 599. 
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We feel that reasonable men cannot differ on the 
fact that the defendants in this case are guilty of negli-
gence regardless of the violation of any ordinance or 
statute. 
3. DEFINITION OF "PARK" 
On page 6 of respondents' brief, a definition of 
'• park'' taken from the Idaho Code is stated. 
According to respondents, "park" means the stand-
ing of a vehicle, whether occupied or not, otherwise than 
temporarily for the purpose and while actually engaged 
in loading or unloading. We say that the defendants' 
conduct falls squarely and directly within this Idaho 
definition of "park", even ifwe accept as true the de-
fendants testinwny that the only purpose in stopping 
was to check the load and to tighten the binders. This 
aet. if true, on the part of the respondents does not 
consist of "actually engaged in loading or unloading". 
The case of State t·s. Hint.z cited by respondents on page 
6 of their brief does not construe the statute quoted by 
respondents but involves an entirely different statute of 
the Idaho Code. 
In fact, it construes a provision of the Idaho Code 
whieil ~pecifically say~ that the statute involved does 
not apply to the driver of anr vehicle which i~ disabled 
while on the paved or improved or 1nain traveled por-
tion ol' a ilig-Jnya~·. It i~ ePrtainly not any authority 
in tili~ <'a~P. 
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\V" e submit that by respondents' own definition, 
the:· were "parked" in violation -of the Alam-eda City 
Ordinance. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, if it i" as a Inatter of law negligence 
to remain in a stalled truck, then certainly as a Inatter 
of law and knowledge and common sense of Courts it 
is certainly negligent to rmnain in a stopped truck when 
the truck is capable of motion and the drivers inten-
tionally stop it for 20 minutes or half an hour on a 
main arterial highway going through a City. Reason-
able minds cannot differ but that it is negligence under 
such circumstances to stop the truck and allow it to 
remain in that position for an appreciable length of time. 
We strongly contend that the stopping of the de-
fendants truck and allowing it to rmnain there with-
out flares constitutes negligence which was a proximate 
eause or contributing factor toward the plaintiff's in-
juries. 
Respectfully Subinitted, 
CHARLES P. OLSON, 
JOHN H. JARDINE, 
:MAURY, SHONE & SULLIVAN 
Attorne:·s for Plaintiff and Appellant 
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